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CSE Seminar

For all tomorrow’s survivors: Mitigating tech abuse via new approaches to computer security

Thomas RistenpartProfessorCornell University
WHERE:
3725 Beyster Building
WHEN:
Wednesday, January 15, 2025 @ 10:30 am - 11:30 am
This event is free and open to the publicAdd to Google Calendar
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Zoom link for remote participants

Abstract:  Computer security is traditionally about the protection of digital systems from adversaries such as criminals or governments. In this talk, I will explore what I call known-adversary threat models, in which the adversary is a member of the victim’s social circles—an intimate partner, family member, or other close acquaintance. I’ll argue that known-adversary threat models represent a widespread and pressing problem, and open up a new frontier for computer security research and practice.

This perspective rises out of my experience doing research and advocacy in the context of intimate partner violence (IPV). Via interviews with survivors and professionals, online measurement studies, and reverse engineering of malicious tools, our research has provided a detailed view of the complex, multifaceted technology abuse that often arises in IPV.  I’ll discuss our efforts on mitigation, including clinical computer security: direct, expert assistance to help survivors navigate technology abuse.  Our work led to establishing the Clinic to End Tech Abuse, which handles hundreds of referrals for survivors per year in New York City. I’ll then discuss research on revisiting computer security mechanisms in abuse settings, showing how consideration of known-adversary threat models can improve mechanism design and, in turn, security and safety of technology users.
The talk will include discussion of physical, sexual, and emotional violence.

Bio: Thomas Ristenpart is a Professor at Cornell Tech and a member of the Computer Science department at Cornell University. Before joining Cornell Tech in May, 2015, he spent four and a half years as an Assistant Professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He completed his PhD at UC San Diego in 2010. His research spans a wide range of computer security topics, with recent focuses including digital privacy and safety in intimate partner violence, anti-abuse mitigations for encrypted messaging systems, improvements to authentication mechanisms including passwords, and topics in applied and theoretical cryptography. His work is routinely featured in the media and has been recognized by numerous distinguished paper awards, two ACM CCS test-of-time awards, a USENIX Security test-of-time award, an Advocate of New York City award, an NSF CAREER Award, and a Sloan Research Fellowship.

Organizer

Cindy Estell

Student Host

Jiwon Kim

Faculty Host

Chris Peikert